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Can foreign direct investment (FDI) stimulate private domestic investment in
Sub-Saharan Africa
i? Or, will private investment by Africans signal profitable
opportunities and stable conditions thus stimulating FDI?  Similar questions apply to the
relationship between FDI and public domestic investment. Will FDI stimulate public
investment in Africa by providing additional tax revenue? Or, is public investment in
infrastructure necessary to make both private domestic investment and FDI profitable?
These questions and the role of FDI in financing development have been debated by
economists for years.
ii However, they are increasingly relevant as equity financing to
developing countries overtakes concessional and non-concessional bank lending. In this
paper, I use data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United Nations
Commission on Trade and Develoment (UNCTAD) and the United Nations Statistical
Office (UNSO) to provide answers to these questions.
Why is determining the timing of FDI, private and public domestic investment
important? Because, economic policy can influence investment decisions and because
investment is critical to the growth process and hence social welfare. Specifically, recent
work by Sachs and Warner (1998) indicates that at least 1% of the 3.4% difference in
growth rates between East Asia and Africa is explained by low investment. In addition,
evidence suggests that private domestic investment plays a much larger role than public
domestic investment in the growth process (Greene and Villanueva, 1991). Yet, private
domestic investment has been heavily taxed in Sub-Saharan Africa, both directly and
indirectly.
iii And finally, while private domestic investment is taxed, special incentives
designed to attract FDI are common in Sub-Saharan Africa.
iv
Using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) techniques developed and
implemented by Arellano and Bond (1998) for dynamic panel data, I establish
empirically both the direction and the magnitude of causality between FDI, private
domestic investment and public domestic investment.
v This methodology is attractive for
two reasons. First, it provides efficient and consistent estimates even in the presence of3
lagged dependent variables without having to rely on several time periods for
consistency. Hence, I am able to estimate both short-run relationships using annual data
and long-run relationships using period averages. And second, by using the optimal
instrument matrix, I am also able to correct for the biases specific to panel data
introduced by measurement error.
Evidence from annual data for 86 countries from all regions of the world
suggests that lagged foreign direct investment has a quantitatively significant impact
on total domestic investment. This impact is strongest for developing countries where
a one percent increase in FDI as a percent of GDP increases domestic investment as a
percent of GDP by as much as 1.17% (Latin America) while in developed countries
the increase is only .54 %.  By disaggregating total domestic investment into its
private and public components, I show that lagged FDI stimulates private domestic
investment and not public domestic investment. Conversely, none of the components
of domestic investment  appear to be good predictors of future foreign investment.
Finally, unlike FDI, lagged public investment does not appear to be a stimulus for
private domestic investment.
Using five year averages, I examine the long-run relationship between FDI and
domestic investment.  I do this because investment tends to be volatile and so I would
like to check the robustness of the results over the long term. I also do this because
sustained investment is required for growth. Again FDI is a stong stimulus for private
domestic investment in all developing regions. However, in the OECD countries, there
is a negative relationship between FDI and private domestic investment over the long
term perhaps indicating some kind of specialization.
Although the evidence presented in this paper is not based on a structural
model, the results obtained are interesting for four reasons. First, they suggest a strong
dichotomy between the behavior of FDI and domestic investment. Second, by
distinguishing between public and private domestic investment, I am able to show that
the behavioral difference is coming from the relationship between FDI and private4
domestic investment. Third, by distinguishing between industrialized and developing
countries, I am able to show that the relationship between FDI and private domestic
investment holds only in developing countries. Hence, any more subjective
interpretation of the results must be able to explain these 3 facts. And fourth, at the
very least, these facts allow us to rule out hypotheses that link FDI to domestic
investment in a negative way.
One way to interpret these facts is to argue that FDI provides positive
spillovers to developing countries that make private domestic investment more
profitable. The plausibility of this argument is strengthened by the fact that these
benefits are only present in less developed countries where the potential for
technological and managerial spillovers are greatest. An alternative interpretation
might be that FDI is primarily undertaken by multinationals that have greater access to
information and financial resources than most private investors in developing
countries. Hence, they are able both to identify and take advantage of profitable
opportunities more quickly than domestic investors. In order to nail down the "true"
explanation more detailed analyses using case studies and/or firm level data are
required.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the related
theoretical and empirical work. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 describes the
methodology and presents the results. Implications of the findings and concluding
remarks are presented in Section 6.5
2. Background
Table 1 highlights three important facts. First, FDI as a percent of total investment
is miniscule when compared with private and public domestic investment. While there is
some variation in the relative magnitude of FDI across regions, this is generally true for
all regions of the world both developed and under-developed. Whatever the reason for
this, the fact remains that the majority of investment is domestic investment. Second,
what distinguishes the developed regions from the underdeveloped regions is the percent
of private domestic investment as a percent of total investment. For example, private
domestic investment accounts for 53% of total investment in Africa while it accounts for
79% of total investment in the OECD countries.  And third, the fastest growing
developing region, East Asia, stands out for two reasons. Total investment as a percent of
GDP is higher in East Asia than in any other developing region and public investment as
a percent of total investment is lower in East Asia than in any other developing region.
Table 1
How Important is FDI as a Source of Capital?
                                                     (1970-1996)                                                              
             Total  Foreign          Private Public
Investment Direct.  Domestic Domestic
as % GDP as % total as % total as % total
Africa .18 .03 .53 .44
South Asia   .17 .01 .64 .35
East Asia .28 .07 .65 .28
Latin America .21 .05 .62 .33
OECD .21 .05 .79 .16
___________________________________________________________________
Sources:International Financial Statistics Tape, 1997. World Investment Directory,
Volume V, Africa, 1996. Adam and O'Connell, 1997.6
So, why all the special attention to FDI? It is possibile that FDI acts as a catalyst for
domestic investment. For example, several economists have argued that foreign
investment was responsible for the surge in domestic investment in the garment industries
in Mauritius and Bangladesh.
vi  If this is the case, then the numbers in Table 1 above
understate the importance of FDI.
vii Others argue that foreigners will not invest in Africa
until the Africans have proven that investment in Africa can be profitable.
viii In other
words, it is domestic investment that will act as a catalyst for foreign investment. Hence,
policy should be designed primarily to encourage domestic investment. 
ix In this section, I
will summarize both the theoretical and empirical evidence surrounding the links
between FDI and domestic investment.
Why Would FDI Stimulate Domestic Investment?
Economic theory points to at least two distinct channels through which FDI may
affect both private and public domestic investment in the recipient country. First, FDI
may have an impact on the profitability of domestic investment. For example, foreign
investors may be directly involved in providing infrastructure such as transportation and
telecommunications thus increasing the profitability of domestic investment. In contrast,
FDI may reduce domestic investor's profits by taking market share away. Second, FDI
may alter the ownership structure of total investment in the host country and/or make
domestic investment possible by providing additional funding. For example, a
privatization sale to a foreign firm will have no impact on total investment and a negative
impact on domestically financed investment. These potential links between FDI  and
domestic investment are summarized in Table 2.1. 7
______________________________________________________________________
Table 2.1
Inward Foreign Direct Investment and Domestic Capital Formation:The Theory    
Impact on Domestic
Investment                               Mechanism                                                    Source(s) _   
 (+)   Increase  ¤build infrastructure (roads, tele- Cardoso &
Profitability communications etc.) Dornbusch
1988
¤supply scarce inputs  Helleiner
1988
¤demand creation (local input suppliers, Cardoso &
labor income, complements) Dornbusch
1988
¤positive externalities (training,  Blomstrom
managerial skills, technology, access 1989
to overseas markets, market information)
¤additional tax revenue invested in Cardoso &
public goods Dornbusch
1988
(- ) Reduce  ¤increase wages and/or cost of other Lall &
Profitability locally supplied inputs Streeten
1977
¤worsen terms of trade Bhagwati,        
Brecher, Findlay
1981,1983
¤stifle domestic competition Helleiner
1988
¤negative externalities (tariff-jumping Brecher &
FDI, corruption) Diaz-Alejandro
1977
(0 ) New  ¤New projects financed by FDI have no Fry
Financing impact on existing domestic  1993
(-) Replacement  ¤Privatisation and/or buyouts replace Fry
Financing domestic with foreign 1993
________________________________________________________________________8
Empirical evidence can be  grouped into two broad categories:macroeconomic
studies and microeconomic studies.  The macroeconomic studies typically use aggregate
measures of investment to study either one particular country or a panel of countries. For
example, Fry (1993) uses macroeconomic data for a sample of 16 countries to show that
FDI can have a positive or a negative impact on domestic investment depending on the
level of trade barriers and financial regulations imposed by the host country. The
microeconomic studies include case studies and studies that use firm level panel data for
specific countries. One particularly interesting paper along these lines is Aitken and
Harrison's "Do Domestic Firms Benefit from Foreign Direct Investment?", March 1997.
Using a panel of  more than 4,000 Venezuelan firms, they show that the impact of FDI on
domestic investment depends on the ownership structure. In particular, FDI that
participates with domestic firms in a joint venture arrangement enhances the profitability
of the domestic investment. By contrast, FDI negatively affects the productivity of firms
with 100% domestic ownership. On balance, they find that FDI has a positive impact on
domestic investment. Evidence from this and other emprical work is summarized in
Table 2.2.
One thing that these tables should make clear is that neither the theoretical work
nor the empirical evidence provides a definitive answer as to the impact of FDI on
domestic investment. On balance, however, the empirical work seems to suggest that
FDI has a positive impact on domestic investment. Also clear from these tables is the fact
that several of the ways in which FDI affects domestic investment have little to do with
the "foreign" component of the investment. For example, most of the demand and supply
side linkages could just as easily be a result of an increase or decrease in domestic
investment. Imagine an economy that experiences an exogenous increase in the price of
its exported good. This will increase the exportables sector's demand for labor, increase
wages and reduce domestic investment in other sectors of the economy. The areas in
which FDI seem to make a unique contribution related to its "foreigness"  as compared to
domestic investment are:technology, management, market-access and financing. This is




Inward Foreign Direct Investment and Domestic Capital Formation:Empirical
Evidence   (1975 - present)
1
===============================================================
Date                Author(s)                 Data                      Methodology             Results_____
1997 K.K. Mbekeani South Africa 2SLS +
Macro Error Corr. Model
1997 Brian Aitken Venezuela Time Series +  Joint Venture
Ann Harrison Firm level Panel & Fixed -   No local
data Effects partner
1997 Maxwell Fry 46 country Time Series +
panel Structural Model
3SLS
1993 Louis T. Wells East Asia Case Studies +
1993 Wells & Warren Indonesia Case Study +
1993/94 Maxwell Fry Macro  Time Series + /- depends
16 countries Structural Model on policies
1966-88 3SLS in place
2
1992 Katikati Ghana Time Series -
Granger Causality
1992 Faroque & Morocco Structural Model -
Bougrine Time Series
1989 Rhee & Belot Asia & Africa 11 country +
Latin America case studies




1977 Matos Venezuela Case Study -
_______________________________________________________________________
Notes: (1) Prior to 1975, several studies were done on the impact of MNCs in Latin America. Most of these
are case studies and it would be impossible to list all of them in this table. For a good summary of these see
Grieco, 1986. (2) For example, Encarnation & Wells find that where FDI substitutes for imports because it
is "tariff-jumping", the overall impact on the host country is negative.10
Why Would Domestic Investment Stimulate FDI?
So little has been written about the impact of domestic investment on FDI that I
am able to summarize it in a couple of paragraphs without resorting to tables. In theory,
there appear to be several ways in which domestic investment might act as a catalyst for
FDI. One obvious channel is public investment in physical and human infrastructure. The
better the infrastructure, the more profitable FDI, therefore ceteris paribus, we would
expect to see FDI follow increases in public domestic investment. Another plausible
argument is that private domestic investors have more accurate information about the
local business climate than do foreign investors. When information is incomplete,
domestic investment acts as a signal about the state of the economy to foreign investors.
Thus, we would expect to see domestic investment lead foreign direct investment.
x
To be fair, several studies that look at the determinants of FDI include market size
and/or expected GDP growth. Hence, to the extent that domestic investment determines
GDP growth and/or market size, these papers indirectly include total domestic investment
as a signal about the future profitability of foreign direct investment. Harrison and
Revenga (1995) explicitly include domestic investment as an explanatory variable but
find that compared with the size of the local market and openness to trade domestic
investment has no impact on FDI. Fry (1993) in an empirical study of FDI in South Asia,
argues that the best way to encourage FDI is to implement policies that generally improve
the investment climate. According to Fry, "Where domestically financed investment is
booming, FDI will seek to participate." Hence, he argues that as a general principal,
policies that encourage domestic investment will also stimulate foreign direct investment.
3. The Data
All data are annual. Data on total domestic investment, FDI and GDP come
from the IMF's Balance of Payments Statistics Tape. Data on FDI for Africa were
cross-checked with UNCTAD's data on foreign direct investment published in the11
World Investment Directory, Volume V, 1996. This was done because UNCTAD's
data are more recent, accurate and complete. Data on public and private domestic
investment come from UNSO's National Accounts tape. A complete definition of each
of the series used is provided below. Summary statistics are provide in Table 3.
Technically, the definition of FDI includes equity capital, reinvested earnings
and intra-company loans. However, there is a serious lack of comparability of the FDI
data of different countries. This lack of comparability may result in discrepancies
between total outflows and total inflows or between outward stocks and inward stocks.
There are three main reasons for the lack of comparability and discrepancies. First,
most countries depart in one way or another from the definitional conventions
recommended by the IMF or OECD. Second, countries differ in their methods of data
collection and, often rely on Central Bank records compiled for Balance of Payments
purposes as opposed to company surveys. Thus, many countries are unable to account
for reinvested earnings. Third, corporate accounting practices and valuation methods
differ between countries.
Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) is the measure of total investment for
each country and includes both private and public sector investment and excludes
changes in stocks. This series was obtained from the international financial statistics
tape for all countries for which the data was available. Domestic investment is
obtained by subtracting FDI from GFCF. Private & Public Gross Fixed Capital
Formation is investment by ownership and also excludes changes in stocks. These
series were obtained from the United Nations National Accounts database.12
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics
                                                                                                                                             
Standard  Number of
Variable                          Mean                             Deviation                      Observations    




Africa .01 .03 638
East Asia .03 .04 120
South Asia .002 .004 116
Latin America .01 .02 374




Africa .18 .12 638
East Asia .28 .06 120
South Asia .17 .05 116
Latin America .17 .06 374




Africa .17 .06 115
East Asia .23 .05   36
South Asia .15 .04   67
Latin America .17 .07   98




Africa .05 .03 115
East Asia .04 .01   36
South Asia .04 .02   67
Latin America .03 .02   98
OECD .03 .02 433
____________________________________________________________________
sources:(1) International Monetary Fund (IMF) and United Nations Commission on Trade and
Development. Series is Inward Direct Investment meaning that it does not include FDI by host country
nationals in foreign countries. (2) Source is IMF and series is gross fixed capital formation minus FDI.
(3) & (4) Source is United Nations National Accounts.13
4. Determining the Direction of Causality
In this section, I will briefly outline the econometric theory used to derive the
results. Only the special problems associated with performing causality tests on a
panel are highlighted. A definition of the Granger causality test is provided in an
appendix. The theory below is presented using general notation to keep the
presentation as simple as possible and to keep the focus of the discussion on the
methodology rather than the notation. Next, I specify the estimating equation based on
the econometric theory. The results are discussed and a summary table of the main
results is presented. Details of the estimation are provided in an appendix. Finally, I
discuss some of the limitations of this analysis.
Econometric Theory
Performing causality tests on a panel introduces a unique set of problems
(Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen, 1988). First, there are the usual complications
associated with pooling data from different cross-sectional units. At least, we must
control for unobserved country-specific heterogeneity. Second, when lagged
dependent variables appear as explanatory variables, as they do in this case, the
maximum likelihood estimator, even under the fixed effects formulation, is no longer
consistent in the typical situation in which a panel involves a large number of
individuals, but over only a short period of time.
xi The problem arises because
estimation of the coefficients by the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) approach
eliminates the unkown individual constant from each observation. This in turn creates
a correlation of order (1/T) between the explanatory variables and the residuals in the
transformed model. Obviously, as T goes to infinity, this problem goes away.
However, when the series is short, not correcting for this will bias the estimates
downward.14
To address the first set of issues, I use the following general model,
(i = 1, .... N; t=1, .... , T),
where N stands for the number of cross-sectional units observed over T periods,  and fi
is the unobserved heterogeneity of the cross-section units assumed to be fixed.
To address the problem created by the presence of lagged dependent variables, I
use the generalised method of moments technique (GMM) . The first step of this
procedure involves taking first differences to eliminate the unknown fixed effect. The
result of first-differencing is shown in equation (6). Here we see that first-differencing to
eliminate the original problem creates a new problem i.e. the regressors are now
correlated with the error term,
(i = 1, .... N; t=1, .... , T-1).
Consistent estimates of the parameters of this equation can be obtained by using either
xit-2-xit-3 and yit-2-yit-3 or xit-3 and yit-3 or both as instruments. However, in practice,
using only the second lags of the first differences as instruments provides
unsatisfactory results since the first-differencing introduces noise and reduces fit
significantly. The technique pioneered by Arellano and Bond combines the moment
conditions for equations in first differences and the equation in levels. This approach
is an extension of Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995) and is
implemented in the revised version of the Dynamic Panel Data (DPD) program by
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consistent estimates even in the presence of measurement error (Griliches and
Hausman (1986)).
Empirical Specification and Results
Using both annual data and five year averages for the period 1970 to 1996
xii, I
estimate the following system of equations:
where j denotes the region, m denotes the lag length and is chosen to ensure that the  u
t  and v t  are white noise error terms. The   a' s , b 's ,   d's  and   g 's are the coefficients
of the linear projections of F and D on a constant and past values of F and D. F and D
represent foreign and domestic investment and are computed as a percent of GDP.
xiiiUnobservable, time-invariant country characteristics are denoted by cdum and dum
controls for year to year cyclical fluctuations.
All estimates are computed with time dummies and regional slope dummies.
Although not reported, it is possible to reject the hypothesis that slope dummies across
regions are the same and it is possible to reject the hypothesis that the year dummies
are jointly insignificant. Two sets of results are reported in each table. The first set of
results (LSDV) controls for unobserved country heterogeneity and are based on
equation (9). The second set of results (GMM) is based on first differences of equation
(9) and instruments the lags to control for measurement error and the possible bias
arising from the presence of lagged dependent variables. The two sets of results are
reported as a robustness check and also to show the magnitude of the difference in
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Correcting for the biases caused by measurement error and the presence of
lagged dependent variables is particularly important for the estimations using 5 year
averages. This is to be expected since the averaging significantly reduces the number
of time periods aggravating the bias caused by the presence of the lagged dependent
variable. Hence, all of the results discussed below are based on the GMM estimates.
Regional estimates are computed to test the hypothesis that FDI might have a
differential impact on domestic investment depending on the policies in place in the
host country.
xiv
Table 4 on the following page summarizes the main results from appendix
tables A.1-A.4. "Short-run" refers to results obtained using annual data, and
"long-run" refers to results obtained using five year averages. Point estimates reported
in Table 4 are obtained from the tables in the appendix by adding the differential slope
coefficient for each region to the coefficient on OECD. Only those estimates that are
significant at or above the 90% level are reported in Table 4. Also, none of the results
for the variables' own lag are reported in Table 4. This is because all four measures of
investment are persistent in all regions as expected.17
Table 4
Impact of a One Percent Increase in Lagged Investment on Current Investment,
by dependent variable/explanatory variable
                                                                                                                                    
                                       (all figures are % change in investment as a percent of GDP)




Latin America 1.17 2.19
OECD 0.54 no
B.  Does FDI › › private domestic investment?  short-run long-run
Africa no 3.71
Asia 5.06             16.32
Latin America 1.01 2.52
OECD no no
C. Does FDI › › public domestic investment?  short-run long-run
Africa no 1.27
Asia no 2.27
Latin America no 1.04
OECD no no
D. Does Total Domestic Investment › › FDI?  short-run long-run
Africa no no
Asia no no
Latin America no no
OECD                                                                                        -.02               -0.12
E. Does Private Domestic Investment › › FDI?  short-run long-run
Africa no                -0.02
Asia no                 0.03
Latin America 0.46             -0.05
OECD no                -0.21
F. Does Public Domestic Investment › › FDI?  short-run long-run
Africa no no
Asia                                                  -0.44 no
Latin America                                                  -0.26 no
OECD no no
             ___________________________________________________________________
sources: FDI is from International Monetary Fund (IMF) and United Nations Commission on
Trade and Development. Series is Inward Direct Investment meaning that it does not include
FDI by host country nationals in foreign countries. Investment is from IMF and series is gross
fixed capital formation minus FDI. Private and public are from United Nations National
Accounts. Short-run results based on annual data, long-run results based on 5 year averages
and no means not significant at or above the 90% level.18
Does FDI stimulate domestic investment?
Generally speaking, the answer to the above question is yes. Table 4 shows that a
one percent increase in FDI as a percent of GDP is followed by as much as a 1.17 percent
increase in future domestic investment as a percent of GDP in Latin America. In fact,
there is an interesting asymmetry between the OECD countries and the developing
countries. In the OECD countries, lagged FDI and lagged domestic investment have a
similar impact on current domestic investment. A one percent increase in either domestic
investment or FDI as a percent of GDP increases future domestic investment as a percent
of GDP by about .5%. For the developing regions however, the impact of lagged FDI on
domestic investment is more than two times the impact of lagged domestic investment on
domestic investment. For example, a 1% increase in FDI as a percent of GDP increases
the following years' domestic investment as a percent of GDP by 1.17% in Latin
America, .91% in Asia and .80 % in Africa.
These results are even more pronounced when 5 year averages are used. In all
regions, a one percent increase in lagged domestic investment as a percent of GDP
increases next years domestic investment as a percent of GDP by about .5%. On the other
hand, lagged FDI is now inversely related to domestic investment in the OECD countries.
And, in the developing countries, lagged FDI has a positive and large impact on current
domestic investment. An average one percent increase in FDI as a percent of domestic
investment over a five year period increases domestic investment as a percent of GDP by
an average of about 2% of GDP over the next five year period.
To understand what is driving these results, I break domestic investment into
its private and public components. This reduces the sample to 46 countries because for
many countries the breakdown between public and private investment is not available.
Panel B of Table 4 shows that lagged FDI has a strong positive effect on private
domestic investment in developing countries. This is true both in the short-run and
long-run however, the effects are more pronounced in the long-run. An average one
percent increase in FDI as a percent of domestic investment over a five year period19
increases private domestic investment by between 16.32% (Asia) and 2.52% (Latin
America) of GDP over the next five year period. Panel C of Table 4 shows that lagged
FDI also has an impact on public investment in the long-run. On the other hand, FDI
has no impact on public or private investment in the OECD countries.
Does Domestic Investment Stimulate FDI?
Here the answer to the above question appears to be no. This is true for both the
developing countries and the OECD countries. But, again there is an asymmetry between
the OECD countries and the developing countries. Panel D of Table 4 shows that in the
developing countries domestic investment has no impact on FDI. For the OECD
countries, the relationship between lagged domestic investment and FDI is negative both
in the short-run and in the long-run. Using the annual data, I find that a one percent
increase in domestic investment as a percent of GDP reduces FDI as a percent of GDP by
.02 percent in the following year. The effect is magnified using the 5 year averages where
a one percent increase in domestic investment as a percent of GDP reduces FDI as a
percent of GDP in the next five year period by .26%. Looking at the breakdown between
private and public, we see that the results are coming from the relationship between
private domestic investment and FDI. Panel E shows that an average one percent increase
in private domestic investment as a percent of domestic investment over a five year
period reduces FDI as a percent of GDP by an average of about -.21% of GDP over the
next five year period. The negative sign probably reflects the substitution of foreign
capital for domestic capital rather than a reduction in the profitability of domestic capital
in the OECD countries.
In addition, and somewhat surprisingly, panel F shows that public investment
is not a catalyst for FDI in any region of the world in the short or long-run. Although
not shown in Table 4, public investment is also not a catalyst for private domestic
investment, in any region of the world over either time horizon. In fact, in developing
countries, there is a slightly negative relationship between public investment and FDI20
which may reflect the privatization of public enterprises.  This runs counter to what we
might have thought about the importance of government investment in infrastructure.
6. Conclusion
In summary, I conclude that FDI is a strong catalyst for domestic investment in
developing countries. The fact that lagged FDI has a stronger impact on private
domestic investment than lagged private domestic investment itself suggests that FDI
brings with it technological and managerial capabilities that make private domestic
investment more profitable. This evidence is strengthened by the asymmetry between
the developing countries and the OECD countries. The majority of FDI in developing
countries is done by multinationals from technologically advanced countries. The
majority of FDI in the OECD countries is also done by multinationals however, the
overall level of technological advancement between host and recipient tends to be
similar for the OECD countries. Hence, the scope for making private domestic
investment more profitable via technological and managerial spillovers is limited in
the OECD countries.21
ENDNOTES
i For the remainder of the paper, I will use Africa to refer to Sub-Saharan Africa.
ii Hirschmann called these "forward and backward" linkages.
iii Christopher S. Adam and Stephen A. O'Connell, 1997.
iv World Investment Directory, Volume V, Sub-Saharan Africa, 1996.
v Several papers, both theoretical and empirical have examined the impact of foreign direct investment on
domestic investment. However, to my knowledge, nobody has looked specifically at the impact of domestic
investment on FDI.
vi Rhee & Belot, 1989.
vii It is also possible that foreigners have "deeper pockets" and are able to pay higher rents.
viii Ridell et al, 1991.
ix Ibid.
x A recent paper by Razin et al. argues just the opposite. In the presence of asymmetric information, FDI
actually acts as a catalyst for domestic investment.
xi The bias is caused by having to eliminate the unknown individual constant from each observation, which
creates a correlation of order 1/T between the explanatory variables and the residuals in the transformed
model. When T is large, the RHS variables become asymptotically uncorrelated.
xii For some countries, data is available for a longer time period (Canada for example has data on both types
of investment all the way back to 1948) but the majority of countries do not have data on FDI prior to 1970.
xiiiThis was done mostly out of concerns about stationarity of the time series data on investment
measured in levels. Estimates of the dollar impact of investment today on future dollars of investment
may be derived using the following approximation, ¶dt/¶ft-1 = d (yt/yt-1) = d(1+gt), where g is growth of
gdp, y is gdp and d and f are domestic and foreign investment.
xiv Of course different countries in different regions pursue different policies. But, as a first approximation,
one could argue that regions with higher growth like East Asia generally had better policies in place.22
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Table 4
DOES FDI STIMULATE DOMESTIC INVESTMENT?
                                         (Investment as a Share of Gross Domestic Product - annual data 1970-1996)
Dependent Variable:              Total            Private            Public
Domestic Investment Domestic Investment Domestic Investment
Regressors: LSDV GMM LSDV GMM LSDV GMM
Foreign Direct Investment (-1)
Africa 0.46 0.26 0.85 0.55 0.06 -0.13
(1.81) (3.21) (2.63) (0.87) (0.77) (0.69)
Asia 0.52 0.37 2.14 5.06 0.26 1.04
(2.38) (3.12) (1.96) (2.42) (0.51) (0.77)
Latin America 0.47 0.63 0.38 1.01 0.09 -0.07
(1.97) (3.51) (1.14) (1.69) (0.68) (0.58)
OECD 0.05 0.54 -0.07 -0.28 -0.03 0.11










Private Domestic Investment (-1)
Africa -0.27 -0.92 0.05 0.05
(2.97) (3.86) (1.93) (0.71)
Asia 0.09 -0.56 0.07 0.04
(0.91) (2.08) (1.71) (0.41)
Latin America -0.06 -0.87 0.04 -0.19
(0.58) (1.22) (1.17) (0.66)
OECD 0.83 0.93 0.00 -0.01
(18.19) (4.04) (0.01) (0.09)
Public Domestic Investment (-1)
Africa -0.52 -0.52 -0.17 -0.16
(1.14) (1.14) (0.95) (0.67)
Asia 0.26 0.26 -0.03 0.21
(0.36) (0.36) (0.16) (0.77)
Latin America -0.82 -0.82 0.09 -0.02
(1.45) (1.45) (0.68) (0.12)
OECD 0.41 0.41 0.68 0.38
(1.19) (1.19) (6.43) (4.91)
n 1704 677 677
R
2 0.85 0.85 0.93
Sargan Test 57.71
Data Source: All data come from International Financial Statistics tapes. Data on foreign direct investment for Sub-
Saharan Africa was updated using the United Nations Commission on Trade and Development Investment Directory 
Volume V, published in 1997. Notes: (1) Year dummies are included in all three sets of estimations. (2) Values in 
parentheses are absolute t-statistics. (3) Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity.28
Table 5
DOES FDI STIMULATE DOMESTIC INVESTMENT?
                                         (Investment as a Share of Gross Domestic Product - five year averages)
Dependent Variable:              Total            Private            Public
Domestic Investment Domestic Investment Domestic Investment
Regressors: LSDV GMM LSDV GMM LSDV GMM
Foreign Direct Investment (-1)
Africa 2.78 2.89 0.82 3.71 0.19 1.27
(2.35) (2.67) (0.55) (2.52) (0.53) (2.93)
Asia -0.28 2.18 7.89 16.32 1.87 2.27
(0.25) (2.35) (2.77) (8.11) (2.64) (4.22)
Latin America 2.19 1.99 0.85 2.52 0.07 1.04
(2.18) (2.89) (0.72) (1.28) (0.19) (2.31)
OECD -1.76 -4.21 0.25 -2.29 -0.26 -0.71










Private Domestic Investment (-1)
Africa -0.39 -0.66 -0.09 -0.01
(1.29) (4.39) (0.99) (0.21)
Asia -0.01 -1.19 0.12 -0.15
(0.04) (1.61) (1.27) (1.25)
Latin America -0.41 0.17 0.12 0.09
(0.88) (0.58) (1.02) (1.45)
OECD 0.48 0.45 0.09 0.04
(2.67) (3.09) (1.49) (0.62)
Public Domestic Investment (-1)
Africa 0.32 0.39 -0.42 -0.51
(0.39) (0.37) (1.52) (3.22)
Asia -0.34 -0.61 -0.53 -0.44
(0.49) (0.26) (2.01) (1.23)
Latin America -1.69 -0.66 -0.62 -0.82
(2.21) (0.72) (1.79) (4.86)
OECD 0.69 0.91 0.28 0.38
(1.79) (0.91) (1.65) (2.59)
n 283 146 146
R
2 0.83 0.76 0.92
Sargan Test 4.59 13.45
Data Source: All data come from International Financial Statistics tapes. Data on foreign direct investment for Sub-
Saharan Africa was updated using the United Nations Commission on Trade and Development Investment Directory 
Volume V, published in 1997. Notes: (1) Year dummies are included in all three sets of estimations. (2) Country 
specific time trends are included in the within and gmm estimations. (3) Values in parentheses are absolute t-
statistics. (4) Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity.29
Table 6
       DOES DOMESTIC INVESTMENT STIMULATE FDI?
(Investment as a Share of GDP - Annual Data 1970-1996)
Dependent Variable:
Foreign Direct Investment Foreign Direct Investment




























Foreign Direct Investment (-1)
Africa -0.24 -0.19 -0.27 -0.47
(1.02) (49.43) (2.03) (1.96)
Asia 0.06 -0.02 0.25 -0.46
(0.44) (0.09) (1.22) (0.79)
Latin America -0.02 -0.27 -0.13 -0.35
(0.07) (19.73) (0.66) (0.96)
OECD 0.56 0.11 0.59 0.47




Sargan Test 76.29 5.19
Data Source: All data come from International Financial Statistics tapes. Data on foreign direct investment for 
Sub-Saharan Africa was updated using the United Nations Commission on Trade and Development 
Investment Directory Volume V, published in 1997. Notes: (1) Year dummies are included in all three sets of 
estimations. (2) Country specific time trends are included in the within and gmm estimations. (3) Values in 
parentheses are absolute t-statistics. (4) Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. A2330
Table 7
       DOES DOMESTIC INVESTMENT STIMULATE FDI?
(Investment as a Share of GDP - five year averages)
Dependent Variable:
Foreign Direct Investment Foreign Direct Investment




























Foreign Direct Investment (-1)
Africa -0.67 -0.71 -0.53 -0.24
(2.54) (3.04) (1.38) (0.46)
Asia -0.44 -0.42 0.51 -0.16
(1.09) (1.56) (1.44) (0.36)
Latin America -0.77 -0.79 -0.24 -1.61
(2.03) (2.73) (0.91) (3.52)
OECD 0.39 0.41 0.41 0.93




Sargan Test 13.79 13.71
Data Source: All data come from International Financial Statistics tapes. Data on foreign direct investment for 
Sub-Saharan Africa was updated using the United Nations Commission on Trade and Development 
Investment Directory Volume V, published in 1997. Notes: (1) Year dummies are included in all three sets of 
estimations. (2) Country specific time trends are included in the within and gmm estimations. (3) Values in 
parentheses are absolute t-statistics. (4) Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. 31TUFTS UNIVERSITY 
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